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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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
II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq:
A clash between a pro-Communist mob and Iraqi police and army units took place in central Baghdad on the afternoon and evening of 5 November. The incident grew out of protest demonstrations by trade unionists, leftist student groups, and other Communist sympathizers--elements which have become increasingly disposed to challenge any government actions not in their favor. The area was still under firm military control on the morning of 6 November; concentrations of troops, tanks, and armored cars were the largest noted in Baghdad since the 14 July anniversary celebration of the Qasim revolution. This new display of Communist militancy may be a further stimulus to an early move by anti-Communist army officer and civilian groups who have been plotting Qasim's overthrow.

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III. THE WEST

France: The initial reaction in France to De Gaulle's 4 November speech has followed established patterns, with a slight tempering of leftist impatience and a definite deepening of rightist apprehension. There is some speculation that De Gaulle's reference to a possible unilateral cease-fire means he may tacitly accede to discussions of political guarantees with the rebels. The hostility of the majority of the European community in Algeria has been reinforced, but Moslems, though reluctant to comment, seemed generally satisfied. The military found comfort in De Gaulle's renewed assurance that the army would remain in Algeria during a self-determination referendum. No official reaction is expected from the rebels before the Algerian provisional government's plenary session, scheduled to open in Tunis on 7 November.

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Argentina: The general strike scheduled to begin on 7 November to protest President Frondizi's veto of a law increasing severance pay will be the first endorsed by all sectors of the Argentine labor movement since Peron's ouster in

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1955. Although Frondizi and Economy Minister Alsogaray believe the strike will be orderly and limited to 24 hours, there may be some disturbances. There are still unresolved problems growing out of the mid-October political crisis, and in late October there was labor violence in Cordoba. [redacted]

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El Salvador: The army is becoming increasingly apprehensive over the failure of ex-President Osorio, who masterminded the coup that ousted the Lemus regime on 26 October, to head off a strong bid for power by Communists and other pro-Castro leftists in the new provisional government.

[redacted] Osorio, whose control over the situation appears to have weakened, told a US Embassy officer on 3 November that he cannot consider restrictive action against the extreme left--he denies Communists are in the government--lest the unity the provisional regime needs to implement urgent social and economic changes be disrupted. A group of officers claiming a large army following reportedly is considering an early coup. Most Latin American countries have not recognized the provisional government and apparently are delaying action pending further developments. [redacted]

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LATE ITEM

*Communist Bloc: Statements by Soviet and Chinese leaders on the eve of the October Revolution anniversary indicate that neither side has retreated from its previously held positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet presidium member Kozlov, in his keynote address yesterday for the celebrations in Moscow, advanced the usual Soviet claims of achievements both at home and abroad, with no new departures from standard Soviet policy positions. Stressing the validity of Moscow's peaceful coexistence line, Kozlov reaffirmed, in moderate terms, the Soviet stand on points at issue with China and claimed that the USSR's position had been "confirmed by the course of events." In a statement

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evidently directed at the Chinese, he declared the Soviet party remained "irreconcilable to any revisionist distortion or dogmatic deadening" of Communist theory. Probably prefiguring the position the Soviet party will take in the inter-party discussions, Kozlov stressed the need for bloc unity, but asserted that unity depended on the ability of all parties to understand and apply doctrine in the "new historical situation." Since the USSR has been claiming it has been successful, and China has failed, in "creatively applying" Marxism-Leninism, Kozlov appeared to be implying that Chinese willingness to drop "dogmatic" thinking and accept Soviet changes in doctrine is vital for preserving "unity."

On the same day in Peiping, Chinese spokesmen also reaffirmed their commitment to bloc unity and peaceful coexistence, but coupled these affirmations with statements that underscored their differences with Moscow. Foreign Minister Chen I, in a major speech, characterized as "the most important universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" the assertion that Communism can come to power only through "revolutionary means." In an article published on 6 November, Madame Sun Yat-sen, chairman of China's Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, also stated "we must preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism against the assaults of modern revisionists" and the Communists must "mainly rely" on struggle to defeat the West. These strong statements suggest that Peiping will hold to its dogmatic positions during the discussions held by the Communist leaders now meeting in Moscow. The Chinese stress on bloc unity, however, suggests the Chinese may yet hope for agreement in Moscow on a communiqué, at least one such as that arrived at in Bucharest in June which left the points at issue still unresolved. 25X1

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Reactions to De Gaulle Speech on Algeria

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The initial reaction in France to De Gaulle's 4 November speech on Algeria has followed established patterns, with a slight tempering of leftist impatience and a definite deepening of rightist apprehension. George Bidault summed up the rightist reaction: "Unacceptable!" On the left, the most noteworthy reaction is Guy Mollet's basically favorable comment. Parliamentary spokesmen have expressed alarm over De Gaulle's reference to wider presidential powers, but the American Embassy in Paris expects the clear relationship he established between the need for national unity and the solution of the Algerian problem to calm most of the deputies.

There is some speculation that De Gaulle's reference to a possible unilateral cease-fire by France means he may tacitly accede to discussions of political guarantees with the rebels. He continues to insist that hostilities must cease before political negotiations can begin, but he probably hopes the rebels will respond. The Algerian provisional government will probably insist on some concrete evidence of good faith before accepting French assurances of political concessions. French rightist extremists will be alert to any cease-fire initiative, and any coup now in prospect might follow such an initiative.

While the French military found comfort in De Gaulle's renewed assurance that the army would remain in Algeria for a referendum on self-determination, "activist" officers can be expected to take an increasingly antagonistic attitude toward De Gaulle.

The hostility of the majority of the European community in Algeria has been reinforced, but Moslems, who were reluctant to comment, seemed generally satisfied. No official reaction to De Gaulle's speech is expected from the rebels before the plenary session which the provisional government has scheduled opens in Tunis on 7 November. The rebels are expected to stick to the hard line they have adopted, in view of the more favorable international position promises of bloc support have provided. They will be under some pressure from Morocco and Tunisia to explore any French overtures, however, because of the apprehension of all North African states over the threat of Communist influence in the area.

Argentine General Strike Called for 7 November

A general strike, to begin on 7 November in protest of President Frondizi's veto of a law passed on 30 September increasing severance pay, will be the first strike to be endorsed by all sectors of the Argentine labor movement since Peron's ouster in 1955. Anti-Peronista labor leaders have called strikes on their own since 1955, but they have refused to cooperate in the Peronistas' strikes, which frequently were called for political reasons.

The vetoed law would have raised severance payments from the current maximum of about \$12 for a year of service to between \$30 and \$60, depending on skill. Both government and business officials consider this too large an increase for the economic recovery program to support; labor leaders, however, protest that it is too small.

Although Frondizi and Economy Minister Alsogaray believe the strike will be orderly and limited to 24 hours, some disturbances may occur. There are still unresolved problems growing out of the mid-October crisis, which was precipitated by army complaints over certain of Frondizi's advisers and policies. Frondizi is trying to keep his economic program intact, but he has agreed to some recommendations by the military, including the recent request that Soviet bloc diplomatic missions in Buenos Aires reduce their personnel to the level maintained by Argentina in the bloc.

Other unrest stems from the recent brief strikes in Cordoba and Mar del Plata, which were considered the worst labor violence the Frondizi administration has encountered. The government, however, is empowered to use a state of siege and other special security measures to maintain order.

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Military Plans to Secure 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400060001-5
In El Salvador

The Salvadoran Army is becoming increasingly apprehensive over the failure of ex-President Oscar Osorio, who masterminded the coup that ousted the Lemus regime on 26 October, to head off a strong bid for power by Communists and other pro-Castro leftists in the new provisional government. [] Osorio has lost control over the situation and that the growing number of leftists in government jobs will make it difficult "to clean house" without strong military measures. A group of officers claiming widespread support from army units is preparing a coup, which may be attempted immediately.

Several leftist cabinet members and the three civilians on the six-man junta moved quickly to consolidate their positions by appointing numerous pro-Communists and suspected Communists to key subordinate posts. A military member of the junta told a US Embassy officer on 3 November that most of the initiative in political matters had been conceded to the civilians, who are probably not responsive to Osorio's direction.

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[] Osorio said restrictive measures against the extreme left--he denies there are Communists in the government--cannot be considered at this time, since such action would disrupt the unity the provisional government must have in order to implement urgently needed social and economic changes. []

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The new government already has been recognized by Spain, Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. [] However, President Villeda Morales of Honduras, where Fidel Castro has a small but vocal following, indicated his concern on 4 November to the US Embassy at Tegucigalpa. [] A pro-Communist takeover in El Salvador would also have very serious implication for the stability of Guatemala--where Communists reportedly are plotting a coup with other leftist groups against President Ydigoras--as well as for the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Most other Latin American countries appear to be delaying recognition pending further developments. []

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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